To George B. McClellan

Executive Mansion,
Major Genl. McClellan— Washington, July 1 1862.

It is impossible to re-inforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can; but save the Army at all events, even if you fall back to Fortress-Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out.



To William H. Seward

Hon. W. H. Seward         Washington City, D.C.
New-York—                     June 30 1862

We are yet without communication with Gen. McClellan; and this absence of news, is our point of anxiety. Up to the latest point to which we are posted, he effected everything in such exact accordance with his plan contingently announced to us before the battle began, that we feel justified to hope he has not failed since. He had a severe engagement in getting the part of his army on this side of the Chickahominy over to the other side, in which the enemy lost certainly as much as we did. We are not dissatisfied with this, only that the loss of enemies does not compensate for the loss of friends. The enemy did [can?] not come below White-House[,] certainly is not there now, and probably has abandoned the whole line. Dix’ pickets are at New-Kent C.H.


To John A. Dix

Major Gen. Dix        Washington City, D.C.
Fort-Monroe            June 30, 1862

Is it not probable the enemy have abandoned the line between White House and McClellan’s rear? He could have but little object to maintain it; and nothing to subsist upon. Would not Stoneman better move up and see about it. I think a Telegraphic communication can at once be opened to White-House from Williamsburg. The wires must be up still. A. LINCOLN

To William H. Seward

Hon. W. H. Seward.         Washington City, D.C.
Astor-House—N.Y.          June 29, 1862 6 oclock PM

Not much more than when you left. “Fulton” of Baltimore American, is now with us. He left White House at 11. A.M. yesterday. He conversed fully with a Pay-Master who was with Porter’s force during the fight of Friday and fell back to near McClellan’s Quarters, just a little sooner that [sic] Porter did, seeing the whole of it; staid on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy over night and left for White House at 5. AM. Saturday. He says Porter retired in perfect order, under protection of guns, arranged for the purpose, under orders, and not from necessity, and, with all other of our forces, except what was left on purpose to go to White House, was safely in position over the Chickahominy before morning; and that there was heavy firing on the Richmond side began at 5 and ceased at 7 AM. Saturday On the whole, I think we had the better of it up to that point of time. What has happened since we still know not, as we have no communication with Gen. McClellan. A despatch from Col. Ingalls shows that he thinks McClellan is fighting with the enemy at Richmond to-day, and will be tomorrow. We have no means of knowing upon what Col Ingalls’ founds, his opinion. All confirmed about our saving all property. Not a single unwounded straggler came back to the White-House from the field; and the number of wounded reaching there up to 11. A.M. Saturday was not large.


To George B. McClellan

Washington City, D.C.
Major Gen. McClellan June 28— 1862

Save your Army at all events. Will send re-inforcements as fast as we can. Of course they can not reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed re-inforcement. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your Army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you; had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that re-inforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you or the government that is to blame. Please tell at once the present condition and aspect of things. A. LINCOLN

P.S. Gen. Pope thinks if you fall back, it would be much better towards York River, than towards the James. As Pope now has charge of the Capital, please confer with him through the telegraph. A. L.

McClellan’s dispatch to Stanton, June 28, 12:20 A.M., is as follows: “I now know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war.

“The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the best order. My regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow I could take Richmond, but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army.

“If we have lost the day we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force was too small.

“I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large re-enforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have.

“In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of 10,000 fresh men, I could gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result.

“I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost.

“If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington.

“You have done your best to sacrifice this army.”

McClellan’s last two sentences were deleted by Colonel Edward S. Sanford, military supervisor of the telegraph, from the copy delivered to Stanton, and the fact was not known until 1907 when David H. Bates told the story in Lincoln in the Telegraph Office. They were included, however, in McClellan’s official report as printed in the Official Records.

To Louis M. Goldsborough

Flag Officer Goldsborough:             Washington, D.C.
Fort-Monroe                                       June 28, 1862.

Enemy has cut McClellan’s communications with White-House, and is driving Stoneman back on that point. Do what you can for him with Gun-boats at or near that place. McClellan’s main force is between the Chickahominy and the James. Also do what you can to communicate with him and support him there.


To John A. Dix

Gen. Dix Washington City, D.C. June 28—1862

Communication with McClellan by White House is cut-off. Strain every nerve to open communications with him by James River, or any way you can. Report to me. A. LINCOLN